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Introduction
I am profoundly honored for the opportunity to deliver the keynote
address at this gathering. I congratulate the organizers on the choice of a
conference topic that is also at the heart of the global human rights, peace,
security, and development agenda. ' The political landscape of the world is
dotted with theaters of conflict in which children are direct participants.
The United Nations ("UN"), regional, intergovernmental, and nongovern-
mental organizations continue to call the attention of the international
community to the ongoing recruitment, deployment, and misuse of per-
sons under the age of eighteen years 2 in armed conflicts. Various actors in
t Barrister-at-Law and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone. Former
Executive Secretary of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission; former
Chief of the Human Rights Office, UN Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
("UNMEE"); former Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for the Government of
Gambia; former Attorney General for the Government of Sierra Leone; former Minister
of Justice for the Government of Sierra Leone.
1. See Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children, Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Gra~a Machel, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (1996).
2. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. 1457 ("For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to
the child, majority is attained earlier.").
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the human rights, humanitarian, political, and social sphere have joined in
the effort to eradicate the use of children in armed conflicts. Considerable
progress has been made, although there is still a long way to go. It is there-
fore fitting that such a renowned forum as the Cornell International Law
Journal should at this time strive to make its own contribution to the dis-
course and assist in the search for solutions to the pervasive problem of
child soldiers.
I. Child Soldiers-An Overview of the Problem
There are several characteristics that areas around the world which use
child soldiers in conflicts have in common: They are more likely than not
to be low-income developing countries with collapsed infrastructure, high
unemployment, moribund economic and educational systems, and non-
functioning governments. Bad governance, ethnic rivalry, or high illiteracy
rates may be the cause for this. These conditions tend to entrench dispari-
ties in economic or social circumstances, causing affected youth to feel par-
ticularly marginalized. Consequently, these children become alienated,
distrust the system, and are available as cheap manpower to form factions
in an armed conflict.
The main business of the UN is the maintenance of world peace and
security. The charter of this international body calls upon it to "save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war." Within this context, the UN
continues to lead the fight to contain conflict through peacekeeping opera-
tions. Relating to the problem of child soldiers, the UN has led in the
development of a legal framework to protect children from the harmful
effects of war. This has led to the establishment of international legal stan-
dards regulating the use of children in armed conflict. It has also sought to
focus the attention of the UN Security Council, regional political bodies,
intergovernmental organizations, as well as nongovernmental organiza-
tions on this problem.
I shall begin by briefly examining the involvement of child combatants
both as victims and as perpetrators of atrocities in various armed conflicts,
the impact of such involvement on children and on the communities, and
the international legal regime intended to thwart the phenomenon. I will
then address the difficulties involved in using the international criminal
justice system and in holding children accountable for crimes they commit-
ted during a war. I will also examine the role of the much-acclaimed and
successful UN mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL") in the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of child ex-combatants, as well as other
peace-building efforts in the Sierra Leone peace process.
I wish at this juncture to make two observations: First, peacekeeping
is not solely the domain of the UN; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO"), the Commonwealth of Independent States ("C.I.S."), and the
Economic Community of West African States ("E.C.O.W.A.S.") have also
undertaken peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Also, under
the auspices of the African Union, "homegrown" initiatives for military
Vol. 37
2004 International Peacekeeping and Child Soldiers
intervention in conflict countries by African continental and sub-regional
institutions have been contemplated as well as implemented. It is notewor-
thy at this stage that the African Union Protocol on Peace and Stability
explicitly authorizes the organization to "intervene in a member state in
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity." Doubtless, implementing these proposals will have its
advantages as well as pitfalls. In any case, it is encouraging that it is begin-
ning to create a capacity within the African continent to solve problems
including armed conflicts.
II. Child Soldiers-In Context
"If you grown-ups know that wars are bad, why do you start them and
involve us children?"
-An 11-year-old Eritrean girl in a UN-organized video link-up on World Peace
Day, May 29, 2002
It is well-documented that in many instances local law sanctions or
even reinforces the practice of state and nonstate armed actors' recruiting
children to participate in armed conflicts and hostilities. 3 The Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers lists in its January 2004 Global Report some
85 countries that utilize child soldiers in armed forces, militias, and
paramilitary groups, and highlights an even larger number of countries
debilitated by intrastate wars in which child combatants have participated.
The Coalition estimates that about 500,000 people under eighteen belong
to either state or nonstate armed groups-approximately 300,000 of these
children are thought to be in engaged in active combat. In the Mano River
Basin 4 and the Ivory Coast, faction leaders or their representatives even
participate in a thriving cross-border recruitment effort.5
The methods by which children become members of regular military
forces and nonstate armed groups are a matter of public knowledge and,
no doubt, of international concern. Children may join the army because
they are compelled to do so by law 6 through conscription, or in other cases
they voluntarily enlist or are forcibly recruited. 7 Fighting factions in
3. See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS 1379 REPORT
(2002); see also Jo BECKER, CHILDREN AS WEAPONS OF WAR (2004), available at http://
www.hrw.org/wr2k4/11.htm (providing an overview over the practice of using child
soldiers in armed conflicts and the efforts to end it).
4. The Mano River Union is an economic subregion composed of Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Liberia and named after the Mano River, which flows through all three
countries. It is located southwest of the Ivory Coast.
5. Interview by Human Rights Watch with Roland B, youth leader for Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy ("L.U.R.D."), in Montserrado County, Liberia
(Nov. 5, 2003).
6. In Eritrea, military service is obligatory for all citizens between the ages of 18
and 40, but doubt has been expressed as to whether this minimum age is being
respected.
7. See Silvie-Stoyanka Junod, International Committee of the Red Cross, Commen-
tary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, in COMMENTARY ON THE
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armed conflicts consider children easier soldiers to manage during hostili-
ties. Thus, children are often abducted or press-ganged, and follow instruc-
tions on pain of death. Others sometimes "volunteer" in desperation
because they see the armed groups as an escape route from poverty or as
an opportunity to obtain protection for themselves and their families.
Induction in most cases takes the form of forcing the child to inflict hor-
rific violence on family members or members of the children's community.
Thereafter, the boys and girls as young as ten years old live lives of painful
servitude filled with brainwashing, sexual exploitation, forced marriage,
drugs, and other human rights abuses.8 The psychosocial effects of losing
their childhood and the impact on communities are immeasurable, and the
future of the entire society is jeopardized. A Liberian in an interview with
Human Rights Watch characterized the situation thus:
Most of our brothers, they have been fighting since 1990, so all they think
about is war. But if you are educated, you can think of other things. Many
do not know right from wrong; they don't know the danger of carrying arms
and the damage they have done to our nation for our children and
grandchildren. 9
This is not to say that children are always victims throughout a con-
flict. They have been known to inflict horrific acts of violence on civilian
populations during situations of conflict, including on their peers. For
example, "Base Marine," a recently demobilized ex-child combatant,
addressed the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
Commissioners, I [would] be telling a lie if I deny killing people whilst I was
with the Revolutionary United Front. I killed civilians, soldiers of the Sierra
Leone Armed Forces, as well as Kamajors [a pro-government militia during
the Sierra Leone conflict]. The only thing that I did not do was to carry out
[an] amputation of limbs. 10
III. International Legal Standards Governing Child Soldiers
Over the years, various international organizations have developed
legal standards governing child soldiers. Apart from the protection
accorded children as human beings under the International Bill of Human
Rights, the following instruments form the core of the protection instru-
ments for children.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 1949,
1380 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
8. See generally UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, IRIN
WEB SPECIAL ON CHILD SOLDIERS, at www.irinnews.org (Dec. 2003) (discussing hardships
child soldiers face).
9. Interview with Tony Tate Roland B in Montserrado County, Liberia, reported in
How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH, Feb. 2004.
10. Human Rights Watch, Children's Rights: International Legal Standards Gov-
erning Child Soldiers, at www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/int-law.htm.
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First, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1' broadly urges
that international humanitarian laws relating to children be respected.
Second, various agreements sharply limit the recruiting of child soldiers:
Thus, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child ("African
Charter") 12 and, by implication, the International Labor Organization's
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 13 completely disallow any recruit-
ment of children younger than eighteen. The Additional Protocol I, which
relates to international conflicts, and Additional Protocol I,14 which
relates to domestic conflicts, set a minimum age of only fifteen for recruit-
ing. Lastly, the UN's Optional Protocol 15 on the Convention on the Rights
of the Child prohibits only recruitment that is either compulsory or for a
nonstate armed group. With regard to voluntary recruitment, the Optional
Protocol encourages States Parties to raise the minimum age for recruit-
ment-hinting that eighteen might be the proper age since children under
eighteen are afforded special protections under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The Optional Protocol further directs those states that
have a minimum age for voluntary recruitment that is younger than eigh-
teen to ensure that any recruitment of children younger than eighteen years
old is truly voluntary, that the children and parents are fully informed of
the duties involved in military service, that the parent or legal guardian
gives informed consent, and that the children tender reliable proof of age.
Third, several of these agreements also sharply limit when children
may participate directly in armed conflicts: With regard to international
armed conflicts, the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
requires States Parties to implement feasible measures to prevent children
under fifteen from participating directly in hostilities, while the Additional
Protocol II flatly states that such children "shall... [not be] allowed to take
part in hostilities." The African Charter provides additional protection for
children under eighteen, requiring States Parties to implement "all neces-
sary measures" to prevent such children from participating directly in hos-
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 77(2), opened for sig-
nature Dec. 12 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter "Additional Protocol I"].
12. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), available at http:// www.unhcr.ch/refworld/refworld/legal/
instrume/children/afr e.htm [hereinafter "African Charter"]. The African Charter was
adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1990 and came into force in November
1990.
13. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, No. 182, June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M.
1207, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm. It requires signatory
states to prohibit and eliminate the "worst forms of child labor," defined as including the
forced or compulsory recruiting of children for use in armed conflict. The term "chil-
dren" is explicitly defined as referring to children younger than 18 years old.
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 4(3)(c), opened
for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/93.htm [hereinafter "Additional Protocol II"].
15. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
54/263, available at http://www:unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm.
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tilities. The Optional Protocol requires that those states that voluntarily
recruit children under eighteen into the state armed forces do not use these
young recruits in armed conflicts.
Finally, the Rome Statute16 of the International Criminal Court con-
fers upon the Court jurisdiction over the war crime of conscribing or
enlisting children younger than fifteen years of age for use in hostilities.
Commentators have been quick to point out that reality does not
always conform to the standards set forth in international agreements.
Commanders of armed groups are usually illiterate, unaware of these stan-
dards, and out of the reach of state authority. Even when the standards are
understood, they are often deliberately flouted without repercussions
because the enforcement mechanisms available to the international com-
munity are weak-consisting mainly of diplomatic and international pres-
sure, and at worst, "naming and shaming" by the UN Security Council.
Practically, peacekeeping operations with their multidimensional mecha-
nisms, including Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
("D.D.R.") programs, are proving to be more reliable instruments for tack-
ling the menace of child soldiers in armed conflicts and restoring security
to societies that have disintegrated or crumbled.
IV. Peacekeeping Operations
The main business of the UN is the maintenance of peace and secur-
ity. 17 The peacekeeping operation is perhaps the most visible security pol-
icy instrument. It was initially conceived and used as a mechanism for
separating the fighting forces in interstate conflicts by establishing and
patrolling buffer zones across agreed national boundaries. However, the
nature of war has changed over the years. In the 1990s, more wars were
fought between armed groups within the same country than between
groups in different countries. Realigning itself to this new reality, Kofi
Annan, the UN Secretary-General, called upon "[aill who are engaged in
conflict prevention and development-the UN, the Bretton Woods institu-
tions, governments and civil society organizations-to address these chal-
lenges in a more integrated fashion."
The report of the panel of UN Peacekeeping Operations, the "Brahimi
Panel," reinforced this philosophy in its report, the "Brahimi Report."'18
The backdrop of the Brahimi Panel was the checkered history of peacekeep-
ing; thus, failures, such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda were touted more
loudly than its successes, such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia,
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. There was a need for an overhaul. The
most fundamental recommendation that the panel advanced was that
16. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 183/9 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm.
17. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
18. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/
2000/809 (2000) (Brahimi Report), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/
peace-operations/.
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peacekeeping operations should be conceived, planned, supported, and
executed in a more integrated, unified fashion. The panel took the view
that this was the only way that missions might be able to meet "the linger-
ing forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat
them."
V. The Brahimi Report Definition of Peace Operations
With the needs above in mind, the report defined United Nations
peace operations to consist of the following three components: a conflict
prevention and peacemaking component, a peacekeeping component, and
a peace-building component. Long-term conflict prevention addresses the
structural sources of conflict with the goal of building a solid foundation
for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention
attempts to reinforce them, usually through diplomatic measures. Such
preventive action is low-profile activity-when successful, it may even go
unnoticed altogether.
Peacemaking addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them
to a halt using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be
envoys of government, groups of states, regional organizations, or the
United Nations, or they may be unofficial and nongovernmental groups, as
was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord
in Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent per-
sonality, working independently.
Peacemaking is often a long-term endeavor. This mechanism has
taken longer than fifty years and has developed rapidly in the past decade
from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefire and
forcing separations after interstate wars to a complex model of many ele-
ments, military and civilian, interacting to build peace in the dangerous
aftermath of civil wars.
Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the
Brahimi Report, refers to activities undertaken after the conflict has ended
to reconstruct the foundations of peace and to provide the tools for build-
ing on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of
war. It includes, but is not limited to, measures to reintegrate former com-
batants into civilian society, strengthen the rule of law-for example,
through training, educating, investigating past and existing abuses, and
providing technical assistance for democratic development, including elec-
toral assistance and support for free media-and techniques to promote
peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation.
VI. Complex Operations and the UN Charter
While traditional peacekeeping missions typically utilize military
units and observers to implement and police ceasefire agreements aimed at
forcing separations between warring states, complex operations address
civil wars that are stalemated on the battlefield or terminated by outside
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political or military pressure and aim to redirect the conflict that triggered
the military action to be solved politically.
Complex operations may be authorized in whole or in part by Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, 19 which affirms the rights of UN Member States to
individual and collective self-defense 20 and empowers the Security Council
to define threats to the peace, 2 1 apply sanctions, 22 and take military action
by air, sea, or land forces. 23
Most peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 1991 were established
without reference to Chapter VII, but all of the complex operations begun
since 1999 function in whole or in part under Chapter VII. Even tradi-
tional peacekeeping, which can involve the use of force in self-defense, goes
beyond the mediation and conciliation measures contemplated by Chapter
VI, which refers to "[placific settlement of disputes." Thus, the guiding
principles and practices of peacekeeping have become known as author-
ized by "Chapter six-and-a-half"-consistent with the spirit, but not the let-
ter of the Charter.
VII. Other Key Recommendations
The Brahimi Panel proceeded to make far-reaching recommendations
intended to make peacekeeping operations leaner and more efficient from
inception to exit. In this regard, emphasis was placed on the need for the
following:
* Clear and concise mandates for the peacekeeping operations;
* Provision of adequate manpower, equipment, and financial resources to
enable missions to execute mandates;
* Exhibition of a robust profile by show of force that leaves no doubt in the
minds of the warring parties that force will be used if necessary; and
* Strategies addressing the conflicts created by troop presence and laying a
sound foundation for a durable peace.
The above considerations have influenced the mission mandates of all
current UN missions, including various factfinding missions, thirteen
peacekeeping operations, and twelve peace-building and political missions
in postconflict societies around the world.
A. Reestablishing Security-The UNAMSIL Success Story
The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is now gener-
ally acclaimed as a success story in peacekeeping. Originally established
as an Observer Mission in July 1998, the mandate of the mission was
strengthened in February 2000 through two UN Security Council resolu-
19. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51.
20. Id. art. 51.
21. Id. art. 39.
22. Id. art. 41.
23. Id. art. 42.
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tions24 that increased its troop level to 17,500 and its civilian support staff
to 2,500 at the height of its activities. This followed serious challenges
encountered during efforts by the mission to stabilize the situation in the
country and assist in the implementation of the Lom Accord, which laid
out a peace plan for the resolution of the conflict. In one such incident,
some 500 peacekeepers were abducted and taken hostage by the Revolu-
tionary United Front rebel faction. A Rapid Reaction Force, dispatched
from the United Kingdom, defused the situation and secured the release of
the peacekeepers. A "Technical Training Team" later augmented this force.
Thus, the mission was able to consolidate and implement its mandate
effectively.
In keeping with the Brahimi recommendations, the mission was organ-
ized around a UN Country Team. The head of the UN Country Team, the
"Resident Humanitarian Coordinator," who was at the same time the
United Nations Development Program ("U.N.D.P.") Resident Representa-
tive, was appointed one of the two Deputy Special Representatives of the
Secretary General ("D.S.R.S.G."). This person was responsible for further-
ing governance, stabilization and rehabilitation. In this position the
D.S.R.S.G. bridged the gap between the UNAMSIL military component and
the humanitarian operations undertaken by the Direct UN Development
Group ("U.N.D.P."), the United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF"), the
World Food Program ("W.F.P."), the United Nations Population Fund
("U.N.F.P.A."), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("U.N.H.C.R."), as well as international nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") that undertook humanitarian activity in the country. Today, the
mission is involved in institution-building at all levels as well as in restruc-
turing the society through commissions and projects intended to create
lasting peace and security. Goals of the mission include alleviating the
consequences of and reducing poverty and unemployment, encouraging
good governance, restoring and consolidating government authority, resus-
citating the education system, rebuilding infrastructure, restructuring the
judicial and legal system, and improving a war-ravaged economy.
I will highlight three institutions of the Sierra Leone peace process
with an international dimension that impacted the rehabilitation of ex-
combatants. When I use the term "ex-combatants" I intend to include
child soldiers and youth, because a large proportion of ex-combatants were
recruited when they were children but gave up arms as youths or adults at
the end of the 11-year conflict.
B. Ex-Child Combatants and the Peace Process
More than 50 percent of the population of Sierra Leone consists of
youths and children. Therefore, the major involvement of this large seg-
ment of the population in the conflict was perhaps inevitable. The parties
24. See S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (2000); S.C.
Res. 1346, U.N. SCOR, 4306th mtg. at 1-2, 12 (Mar. 30, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346
(2001).
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to the Lom Accord recognized that the violence in the conflict had devas-
tating effects on the child combatants who participated in the Sierra Leone
conflict and consequently provided for their reintegration into society.
The Lom Accord had become necessary after the Abidjan Peace Accord
failed to secure lasting peace despite the institution of a D.D.R. program.
Thus, Article XXX of Lom provided:
The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child
soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within and from the
International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Spe-
cial Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agen-
cies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.
This area was rightly given priority in the implementation of the peace
agreement.
C. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.
Lasting peace and security can only be created in a postconflict situa-
tion if the atmosphere is conducive to peace. The first step is to ensure that
the fighting parties on both sides lay down their arms, as they did in Sierra
Leone in a phased disarmament. Some 72,490 ex-combatants-including
6,845 ex-child combatants-were disarmed in a period of just over six
months.
The UN and a consortium of agencies, including the World Bank, the
African Development Bank, and donor countries, funded the program.
UNAMSIL provided security support to the process and took responsibility
for the storage and destruction of the weapons, which was contracted out
to the German Association for Technical Cooperation ("G.T.Z."). UNICEF
took responsibility for caring for the disarmed child combatants and
implemented support programs to enable the children to reenter civilian
life and become productive members of society.
Demobilization took the form of receiving the ex-combatants and pro-
viding them with basic necessities. They were then inducted into civilian
life through orientation activities such as trauma healing, psychosocial
counseling, information sessions, sensitization seminars, and civic educa-
tion.25 The ex-combatants were thereafter given transitional allowances to
support them during their first three months in the places where they
chose to resettle. Ex-child combatants were reunited with their families
and communities of origin, where possible, after orientation.
Of course, the D.D.R. process was not without challenges and
problems: The former child combatants were stigmatized as war criminals
and ostracized by society. Furthermore, those who were conscripted as
children but demobilized as adults did not enjoy as many benefits or as
much attention as those who were classified as children at the time of
demobilization. Some members of this group may not be able to sustain
25. MARK MALLAN ET AL., SIERRA LEONE: BUILDING THE ROAD TO RECOVERY (Inst. for
Security Stud., Monograph Series No. 80, 2003).
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the hope of becoming useful members of society again. Finally, the D.D.R.
program aimed mainly at providing child ex-combatants with "life skills" -
psychological, intellectual, social, technical, and vocational skills in the
hope that they would thereafter be absorbed into the economy. However,
the Sierra Leone economy is weak and rife with unemployment, and the
danger therefore is that these children and young adults will remain idle
hands and vulnerable to being re-recruited to fight in other conflicts in the
region.
D. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("T.R.C.")
was established as part of the peace process pursuant to the Lome
Accord. 26 The Commission's mandate was to create an impartial historical
record of the violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the
Sierra Leone conflict; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of vic-
tims; to promote healing and reconciliation; and to prevent a repetition of
such abuses and violations in the future, 2 7 always paying special attention
to women and child victims of the conflict.
The T.R.C. collected approximately 9,500 statements from all target
groups in the country and the West African subregion, including child ex-
combatants, relating to violations of human rights and humanitarian law
during the conflict. The Commission then heard some 450 witnesses in its
hearings phase. Approximately 13 percent of these were ex-combatants. If
the ex-combatants were under eighteen years old, the hearings were closed.
Without exception, the ex-child combatants expressed apprehension over
returning to their communities for fear of retribution. A study of tradi-
tional methods of conflict management and resolution of all fourteen eth-
nic groups of Sierra Leone was conducted prior to the operational phase of
the Commission. This enabled the Commission, in its work to utilize the
procedures applicable in the respective localities, to initiate reconciliation
between child ex-combatants and their communities. Subsequent monitor-
ing teams of the Commission revealed the children's fears of retribution to
be unfounded.
E. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
This unique institution was established by a United Nations Security
Council Resolution 28 and at the request of the Sierra Leone government. It
is charged with trying persons who "bear the greatest responsibility" for
26. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27.
27. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (2000) (Sierra Leone), available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html.
28. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000) (urg-
ing Sierra Leone to prosecute crimes committed against child soldiers); see also Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., Enclosure, at
21, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOO/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf (establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315).
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violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law during
the conflict in Sierra Leone. Certain individuals were charged with and
indicted for having recruited children for use in conflict and with having
arranged forced marriages. This is the first time that such charges have
been brought against persons before an international tribunal. No doubt,
if the charges result in convictions this will make bush commanders think
twice before forcibly abducting children for use in armed conflicts.
Conclusion
I have attempted to give a brief overview of the current situation of
child soldiers from a legal as well as from a practical perspective. Before
taking my seat, however, I want to play the devil's advocate by raising a few
issues in the hope that they might be useful for our deliberations in the
next two days. First, in some African societies, children traditionally attain
"adulthood" 
-with the accompanying rights and responsibilities of an
adult-by completing certain rituals or joining certain secret societies. Is it
right that international norms should supersede cultural practices that
these societies have followed for centuries? Is there any place for cultural
relativism in implementing some of these international edicts? Second, the
flow of information from governments to the governed in third world coun-
tries is usually weak, and thus citizens are often not aware or do not under-
stand the international treaties that the governments sign on the citizens'
behalf. Should ignorance of these treaties constitute a mitigating factor
despite the cliche that "ignorance of the law is no excuse"? Lastly, my pres-
entation is not exhaustive. I look forward to the question and answer ses-
sion that will follow shortly as well as to the discussions by experts,
colleagues, and participants in the following day. Once again, I thank you
very much for the honor of allowing me to present the keynote address and
for your kind attention this afternoon.
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